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Abstract
In this work we study the problem of communication over the quantum wiretap channel. For this
channel there are three parties Alice (sender), Bob (legitimate receiver) and Eve (eavesdropper). We obtain
upper and lower bounds on the amount of information Alice can communicate to Bob such that Eve gets to
know as little information as possible about the transmitted messages. Our bounds are in terms of quantum
hypothesis testing divergence and smooth max quantum relative entropy. To obtain our result we prove
a one-shot version of the quantum covering lemma along with operator Chernoff bound for non-square
matrices.
1 lntroduction
In this work we consider the problem of communication over a quantum wiretap channel with one sender
(Alice) and two receivers (Bob and Eve). They have access to a channel that takes one input X (supplied
by Alice) and produces two outputs Y and Z, received by Bob and Eve respectively. The characteristic
of the channel is given by pY Z|X . The goal is to obtain bound on the amount of information Alice may
can communicate to Bob such that Eve gets to know as little information as possible about the transmitted
messages.
Secrecy capacity of a sequence of wiretap channels in the information spectrum setting [1]: Bloch
and Laneman studied the above problem in the classical asymptotic non-iid setting (information spectrum)
wherein they defined various measures of secrecy [1]. One such secrecy measure is the L1 distance ‖pMZ −
pM × pZ‖, where the distribution pMZ represents the joint distribution between the transmitted message
random variable and the channel output at the Eve’s end when Alice transmits M . To place our contributions
in place, it will be useful to revisit the result of Bloch and Laneman. But we need the following definitions to
state Bloch and Laneman’s result.
Definition 1. An (n,R, εn, δn)-wiretap code for a sequence of wiretap channels pY Z|X consists of the fol-
lowing:
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• a message setMn :=
{
1, · · · , 2nR};
• a stochastic encoding function en :Mn → X n;
• a decoding function dn : Yn →Mn.
The rate of the code is defined as 1n log |Mn|. Let M be the random variable denoting the uniform choice of
message i ∈ Mn, and Y n(Zn) be the random variable representing the legitimate receiver (eavesdropper)
output corresponding to en(M). The average probability of error is defined as εn = Pr {dn(Y n) 6= M} and
the secrecy is measured in terms of ‖pMZ − pM × pZ‖ .
Definition 2. A rate R is achievable for a sequence of wiretap channels pY Z|X if there exists a sequence of
(n,R, εn, δn)-wiretap code such that limn→∞ εn = 0 and limn→∞ δn = 0.
The supremum of all such achievable rates is called the private capacity of the sequence wiretap channels
pY Z|X and we represent it by P .
Definition 3. (Specrtal inf-mutual information rate [2]) Let V = {V n}∞n=1 and Y = {Y n}∞n=1 be two
sequences of random variables where for every n, V n ∈ Vn, Y n ∈ Yn and (V n, Y n) ∼ pV nY n . The spectral
inf-mutual information I(V;Y) is defined as follows
I(V;Y) := sup
{
β : lim
n→∞Pr
{
1
n
log
pV nY n
pV npY n
< β
}
= 0
}
.
The probability on the R.H.S. of the above equation is calculated with respect to the distribution pV nY n .
Definition 4. (Specrtal sup-mutual information rate [2]) Let V = {V n}∞n=1 and Z = {Zn}∞n=1 be two
sequences of random variables where for every n, V n ∈ Vn, Zn ∈ Zn and (V n, Zn) ∼ pV nZn . The spectral
sup-mutual information I(V;Z) is defined as follows
I(V;Z) := inf
{
β : lim
n→∞Pr
{
1
n
log
pV nZn
pV npZn
> β
}
= 0
}
.
The probability on the R.H.S. of the above equation is calculated with respect to the distribution pV nZn .
We now state the result of Bloch and Laneman [1].
Theorem 1. [1] Let pY Z|X :=
{
pY nZn|Xn
}∞
n=1
represent a sequence of wiretap channels. The secrecy
capacity (P ) for this sequence of channels is the following:
P = max
(V ,X)
(
I [V ;Y ]− I [V ;Z]) , (1)
where (V ,X) represents a sequence of pair of random variables {V n, Zn}∞n=1 .
A quantum version of the wiretap channel was studied by Devetak in [3] and Cai-Winter-Yeung in [4],
where instead of pY Z|X , the channel is characterised by the map NA→BE : S(HA) → S(HBE). They
showed the following.
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Theorem 2. The private classical capacity of a quantum channelNA→BE in the asymptotic iid setting is the
following:
lim
k→∞
1
k
P (N⊗k),
where P (N ) is defined as
P (N ) := max
ρ
(I[V ;B]σ − I[V ;E]σ) ,
where all the information theoretic quantities are calculated with respect to the following state:
σV BE =
∑
v∈V
pV (v)|v〉〈v|V ⊗NA→BE(ρAv ).
2 Our Result
We consider the above problem in the quantum one-shot setting. A quantum wiretap channel takes a quantum
input ρA and produces two quantum outputs ρB and ρE , received by Bob and Eve respectively. The charac-
teristics of the channel is given by NA→BE(ρA) = ρBE . A communication scheme over a quantum wiretap
channel is illustrated in Figure 1 .
ChannelAlice Encoder
Eve
Bob
ρA
M
∈
{ 1, · · ·,2
R
}
TrBρ
BE
TrEρ
BE
NA→BE
ρBE
Mˆ
Figure 1: Private classical information transmission model over a quantum channel
We need the following definition to discuss our results.
Definition 5 (Encoding, Decoding, Error, Secrecy). A one-shot (R, ε, δ)-code for a quantum wiretap channel
consists of
• an encoding function F : [2R]→ S(HA), such that∥∥ρME − ρM ⊗ ρE∥∥ ≤ δ, (2)
where ρME , ρM and ρE are appropriate marginals of the state ρMBE = 1
2R
∑
m∈[2R] |m〉〈m| ⊗
NA→BE(F (m)).
• decoding POVMs {T Bm : m ∈ [2R]} such that the average probability of error
1
2R
∑
m∈[2R]
pe(m) ≤ ε, (3)
3
where
pe(m) = Tr
[(
I− T Bm
)N (F (m))] (4)
is the probability of error when Alice uses this scheme to transmit the message m.
Definition 6. (Quantum hypothesis testing divergence [5]) Let ρV B :=
∑
v∈V pV (v)|v〉〈v|U ⊗ ρBv be a
classical quantum state. For ε ∈ [0, 1) the hypothesis testing divergence between the systems V and B is
defined as follows:
Iε0 [V ;B] := sup
0ΓI
Tr[ΓρV B]≥1−ε
− log Tr [Γ (ρV ⊗ ρB)] .
Definition 7. (Quantum smooth max Re´nyi divergence) Let ρV E :=
∑
v∈V pV (v)|v〉〈v|V ⊗ ρEv be a classical
quantum state. For ε ∈ [0, 1) the smooth max Re´nyi divergence between the systems V and E is defined as
follows:
Iε∞[V ;E] := inf
{
γ :
∑
v∈V
pV (v)Tr
[{
ρEv  2γρE
}
ρEv
] ≤ ε} ,
where ρE = TrV
[
ρV E
]
and
{
ρEv  2γρE
}
is the projector onto the positive Eigen space of the operator
ρEv − 2γρE .
Theorem 3. (Achievability) Let NA→BE be a quantum wiretap channel. Let V be a random variable taking
values in V and F : V → S(HA). Consider the state
ρV BE =
∑
v∈V
pV (v)|v〉〈v|V ⊗NA→BE
(
ρAv
)
. (5)
For every ε ∈ (0, 1) and δ ∈ (0, 2) there exists an (R, ε, δ)-code for the quantum wiretap channelNA→BE if
R ≤ sup
{V,F}
(
Iε
′
0 [V ;B]−max
{
0, I δˆ∞[V ;E]
})
+ log
(
ε′
)
+ log
(
δˆ9
)
−O (log log(dim(HE))) (6)
where 18ε′ ≤ ε and δˆ is such that 144
√
δˆ ≤ δ. The information theoretic quantities mentioned in (6) are
calculated with respect to the state given in (5).
Theorem 4. (Converse) For a quantum wiretap channel NA→BE any (R, ε, δ)-code satisfies the following:
R ≤ sup
{V,F}
(
Iε0 [V ;B]− Iδ∞ [V ;E]
)
+ 1.5, (7)
where V is a random variable over a set V , F : V → S(HA) a map from V to S(HA) and all the information
theoretic quantities are calculated with respect to the following state:
ΘV BE :=
∑
v∈V
p(v)|v〉〈v|V ⊗NA→BE (ρAv ) .
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Techniques: Our achievability proof follows along the line of the proof in [6]. As before, we generate a
row array, whose entries are generated according to the distribution pV ; furthermore, as in the original proof
we partition this array into bands of appropriate sizes and uniquely assign each of these bands to a message.
To send a message m ∈ [2R], Alice chooses a codeword v uniformly from the band corresponding to m;
applies the map F to v and then transmits the resulting state ρAv over the channel. Bob on receiving his
share of the channel output tries to determine the codeword v using standard one-shot decoding techniques
for a point to point quantum channel. He succeeds with high probability for the given codebook size. It only
remains to show that the message m is secret from Eve. The random choice of v from the band corresponding
to m should make Eve’s share of the channel output independent of m. This is the main technical hurdle
that must be overcome in order to prove the correctness of a code for a wiretap channel. In the asymptotic
iid setting, this hurdle is overcome by proving a quantum covering lemma [6, Lemma 16.2.1] based on an
operator Chernoff bound of Ahlswede-Winter [7] for Hermitian matrices . Unfortunately, a straightforward
translation of this technique to one-shot setting fails. In this work, we overcome these difficulties and manage
to prove for the first time a one-shot quantum covering lemma. On the way, we also prove a novel operator
Chernoff bound for non-square matrices.
The proof for the converse (Theorem 4) essentially follows along the line of the proof given in [1]; the
translation to the one-shot quantum setting is straightforward.
Private classical capacity of the quantum wiretap channel in the quantum information spectrum set-
ting. Our bounds allow us to obtain the quantum version of Theorem 1. The quantum information spectrum
technique pioneered by Hayashi and Nagaoka [8] allows one to derive meaningful bounds on rates even in the
absence of the iid assumption; however, the analysis is often more challenging in this setting. The bounds in
our work are expressed using smooth min and max Re´nyi divergences. The close relationship between these
quantities and the quantities that typically arise in the information spectrum setting (see Datta and Leditzky
[9]) allows us to derive the quantum version of Theorem 1.
Related work: In [10] Renes and Renner derive one-shot achievability and converse bounds for the quan-
tum wiretap channel in terms of conditional min and max Re´nyi entropies. They also show that their result
asymptotically yields the results of [3] and [4]. However, the result of Renes and Renner [10] does not seem
to yield the asymptotic characterisation of the wiretap channel in the information spectrum (non-iid) setting.
Such a result as mentioned earlier in Theorem 1 is known for the classical case. We note here that our one-shot
bounds which are stated in terms of two fundamental smooth Re´nyi divergences allow us to characterise the
capacity of the wiretap channel in the information spectrum (asymptotic non-iid) setting; our characterisation
turns out to be nothing but the quantum analogue of the characterisation of Theorem 1.
3 Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. Let ρV B :=
∑
v∈V pV (v)|v〉〈v|V ⊗ ρBv denote the joint state of the system V B, where ρBv :=
TrE
[
ρBEv
]
. Also, let ρB := EV
[
ρBV
]
. Let 0  ΓV B  I satisfy the following properties
(P1) Tr
[
ΓV BρV B
]
> 1− ε′.
(P2) Iε
′
0 [V ;B] = − log Tr
[
ΓV B
(
ρV ⊗ ρB)] .
5
See Definition 6 for the definition of Iε
′
0 [V ;B]. Fix R such that
R ≤ Iε′0 [V ;B]−max
{
0, I δˆ∞[V ;E]
}
+ log
(
ε′
)− log(1016 (log dim(HE))6
δˆ9
(
− ln
(
δˆ
30C
)))
,
where C = dim(HE)
(
log2
(
4 dim(HE)
δˆ
)
+ 1
)2
. Furthermore, let R˜ be such that
R˜ = max
{
0, I δˆ∞[V ;E]
}
+ log
(
1016
(log dim(HE))6
δˆ9
(
− ln
(
δˆ
30C
)))
. (8)
See Definition ?? for the definition of I δˆ∞[V ;E].
Random code generation: For every message m ∈ [2R], let C(m) := {v(m, 1), · · · , v(2R, k)}, denote a
collection of k codewords where k = 2R˜, and for every (m, i) ∈ [2R] × [2R˜], v(m, i) is generated using the
distribution pV . These 2R+R˜ codewords form the codebook denoted by C.
Encoding: To send a message m ∈ [2R], Alice chooses a codeword v(m, i) from C(m) uniformly at ran-
dom. Alice then applies the function F to v(m, i) and transmits the resulting quantum state ρAv (m, i) over the
channel.
Decoding: The decoding strategy we mention here is similar to that mentioned in [5]. Let us define the
following POVM by its element
E(m, i) :=
 ∑
(m′,i′)∈[2R]×[2R˜]
Λv(m′,i′)
− 12 Λv(m,i)
 ∑
(m′,i′)∈[2R]×[2R˜]
Λv(m′,i′)
− 12 ,
where Λv := TrV
[(|v〉〈v|V ⊗ IB)ΓV B]. For every (m, i) ∈ [2R]× [2R˜], Bob is equipped with the decoding
POVM E(m, i). Bob on receiving his share of the channel output uses these decoding POVMs to measure
the received quantum state to guess the transmitted message. If the outcome of this measurement is (m, i),
Bob declares that the transmitted message was m.
Analysis for the probability of error: We now calculate the average probability of error for the above
mentioned encoding and decoding strategy averaged over all the codebooks. Let v(M,L) denote the codeword
chosen for transmitting the messageM , whereM is uniformly distributed over the set [2R] and L is uniformly
distributed over the set [2R˜]. By the symmetry of the random code construction, the average probability
of error is equal to the error probability given the transmission of any specific codeword. Without loss of
generality, we assume that the codeword v(1, 1) was sent; therefore, letting Mˆ as the decoded message random
6
variable, we have
EV
[
Pr{Mˆ 6= 1}
]
≤ EV Tr
[
(I− E(1, 1)) ρV (1,1)
]
a≤ 2EV Tr
[
(I− ΛV (1,1))ρV (1,1)
]
+ 4
∑
(m,i)6=(1,1)
EV Tr
[
ΛV (m,i)ρV (1,1)
]
b
= 2
(
1− Tr [ΓV BρV B])+ 4 ∑
(m,i)6=(1,1)
Tr
[
ΓV B
(
ρV ⊗ ρB)]
c≤ 2ε′ + 22+R+R˜−Iε
′
0 [V ;B]
d≤ 6ε′ (9)
where a follows from Hayashi Nagaoka operator inequality; b follows from the definition of ΛV ; c follows
from the definition of ΓV B and d follows from our choice of R and R˜.
Analysis for the leaked information to Eve: Let ρME :=
∑
m∈[2R]
1
2R
|m〉〈m| ⊗ ρEm be the joint state of
the system ME. Notice that in the setting of the problem for every m ∈ [2R]
ρEm =
1
2R˜
∑
l∈[1:2R˜]
ρEv(m,l), (10)
where ρEv := TrB
[
ρBEv
]
and ρBEv := NA→BE(ρAv ). Furthermore, let ρ˜E = 12R
∑2R
m=1 ρ
E
m and ρ
E :=
EV
[
ρEV
]
. The leakage information is now calculated as follows:∥∥∥∥∥∥
2R∑
m=1
1
2R
(|m〉〈m| ⊗ ρEm)− 2R∑
m=1
1
2R
|m〉〈m| ⊗ ρ˜E
∥∥∥∥∥∥ ≤
2R∑
m=1
1
2R
∥∥ρEm − ρ˜E∥∥ ,
≤
2R∑
m=1
1
2R
∥∥ρEm − ρE∥∥+ ∥∥ρE − ρ˜E∥∥
≤ 2
2R∑
m=1
1
2R
∥∥ρEm − ρE∥∥ ,
where all the above inequalities follow from the triangle inequality. Therefore, by the symmetry of the random
code construction, we have
EC
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2R∑
m=1
1
2R
(|m〉〈m| ⊗ ρEm)− 2R∑
m=1
1
2R
|m〉〈m| ⊗ ρ˜E
∥∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ 2
2R∑
m=1
1
2R
EC
∥∥ρEm − ρE∥∥ ,
= 2EC(1)
∥∥∥∥∥∥ 12R˜
∑
l∈[1:2R˜]
ρEV (1,l) − ρE
∥∥∥∥∥∥ .
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Thus, we can now conclude from Theorem 5 (see Section 6) with ε ← δˆ and I ← max
{
0, I δˆ∞ [V ;E]
}
, that
for our choice of R˜ (see (8)) we have
EC
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2R∑
m=1
1
2R
(|m〉〈m| ⊗ ρEm)− 2R∑
m=1
1
2R
|m〉〈m| ⊗ ρ˜E
∥∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ 48
√
δˆ.
Expurgation: Let ε(C) be a random variable representing the average probability of error where the ran-
domization is over the random choice of the codebook C and let δ(C) be a random variable representing the
leakage information and again the randomization is over the random choice of the codebook C. Further , we
define the following events:
E1 :=
{
ε(C) < 3EC Pr
{
M 6= Mˆ
}}
E2 :=
δ(C) < 3EC
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2R∑
m=1
1
2R
(|m〉〈m| ⊗ ρEm)− 2R∑
m=1
1
2R
|m〉〈m| ⊗ ρ˜E
∥∥∥∥∥∥
 .
Using Markov inequality it is easy to see from the definition of E1 and E2 that
Pr {E1, E2} > 1
3
.
Thus, we can now conclude that if R satisfies the condition of the theorem then there exists an (R, ε, δ)-code
for the quantum wiretap channel.
4 Proof of Theorem 4
We need the following key lemma which can be considered as the quantum generalization of [11, eq. 2.3.18,
p.18].
Lemma 1. Let ρ and σ be two quantum states. Furthermore, let Π := {ρ  2βσ} where β > 0 is arbitrary.
Then,
||ρ− σ|| ≥ 2β ln 2
β ln 2 + 1
Tr[Πρ]. (11)
Proof. The proof follows the fact that ‖ρ− σ‖ ≥ 2Tr [Π(ρ− σ)], [6, Lemma 9.1.1]. The claim now follows
from the following set of inequlities,
‖ρ− σ‖ ≥ 2Tr [Π(ρ− σ)]
a≥ 2Tr [Πρ]
(
1− e−β ln 2
)
b≥ 2Tr [Πρ]
(
1− 1
1 + β ln 2
)
=
2β ln 2
β ln 2 + 1
Tr [Πρ] ,
where a follows because ΠρΠ  2βΠσΠ and b follows because eβ ln 2 ≥ (1 + β ln 2). This completes the
proof.
8
We are now ready to prove Theorem 4. Towards this let V represent the uniform choice of a message in
[2R]. Notice that with this choice of V the assumptions of the Theorem 4 imply that∥∥ρV E − ρV ⊗ ρE∥∥ ≤ δ. (12)
From (12) and setting β ← 1ln 2 , σ ← ρV ⊗ ρE in Lemma 1 we can now conclude that
Tr
[{
ρV E  2 1ln 2 ρV ⊗ ρE
}
ρV E
]
≤ δ. (13)
Thus, from (13) and the definition of smooth max Re´nyi divergence we can now conclude that
Iδ∞ [V ;E] ≤ 1.5. (14)
The claim mentioned in Theorem 4 now follows from the following set of inequalities
R
a≤ Iε0 [V ;B]
b≤
(
Iε0 [V ;B]− Iδ∞ [V ;E]
)
+ 1.5
≤ sup
{V,F}
(
Iε0 [V ;B]− Iδ∞ [V ;E]
)
+ 1.5,
where a follows from [5, Theorem 1] and the fact that smooth min Re´nyi divergence satisfies data processing
inequality [5] and b follows from (14). This completes the proof of Theorem 4.
5 Asymptotics
In this section we show that the one-shot achievability bounds derived in Theorem 3 allow us to characterise
the private capacity of the quantum wiretap channel in the information spectrum setting [8].
Suppose we are given a sequence ~HBE =
{
H(n)BE
}∞
n=1
of Hilbert spaces and a sequence ~N := {Nn}∞n=1
of quantum channels where for every n, H(n)BE := H⊗nBE and Nn : S(H(n)A )→ S(H(n)BE), whereH(n)A = H⊗nA .
We now define achievable rates and capacity for the sequence of wiretap channels ~N .
Definition 8. A rate R is asymptotically achievable for a sequence of quantum wiretap channels ~N =
{Nn}∞n=1 if there exists an encoding function Fn, where Fn : [2R
(n)
] → S(H⊗nA ) and decoding POVMs
{T B(n)m : m ∈ [2R
(n)
]} such that R ≤ lim infn→∞ R(n)n ,
limn→∞ 1
2R
(n)
∑
m∈[2R(n) ] Tr
[(
I− T Bm
)Nn(Fn(m))] = 0 and limn→∞ ∥∥ρME − ρM ⊗ ρE∥∥ = 0.
The supremum of all such achievable rates is called the private capacity of the sequence of quantum
wiretap channels ~N and we represent it by P ( ~N ).
We now mention some convergence results that would allow us to prove a lower bound on the private
capacity of the sequence of wiretap channels ~N .
Lemma 2. (Datta and Leditzky [9]) Let ~ρ = {ρn}∞n=1 and ~ω = {ωn}∞n=1 be an arbitrary sequence of states
with ρn, ωn ∈ S(H⊗n). Then,
(i) limε→0 lim infn→∞ 1nD
ε
0 (ρn‖σn) = I [~ρ; ~ω]
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(ii) limε→0 lim supn→∞
1
nD
ε∞ (ρn‖σn) = I [~ρ; ~ω]
An immediate consequence of the Theorem 3, Definition 8 and Lemma 2 is the following corollary.
Corollary 1. The private capacity P ( ~N ) of the sequence of quantum wiretap channels ~N satisfies the fol-
lowing lower bounds
P ( ~N ) ≥ sup
{V n,Fn}∞n=1
(
I[V;B]− I[V;E]) ,
where for every n, the random variable V n takes values over the set Vn, Fn : Vn → S(H⊗nA ) and all the in-
formation theoretic quantities are calculated with respect to the sequence of state ~ΘV BE :=
{
ΘV
nBnEn
}∞
n=1
,
where for every n
ΘV
nBnEn :=
∑
vn∈Vn
p(vn)|vn〉〈vn|V n ⊗NAn→Bnn
(
ρA
n
vn
)
.
Furthermore, using steps exactly similar to that used in the proof of Theorem 4 we can prove the following
corollary.
Corollary 2. The private capacity P ( ~N ) of the sequence of quantum wiretap channels ~N satisfies the fol-
lowing upper bounds
P ( ~N ) ≤ sup
{V n,Fn}∞n=1
(
I[V;B]− I[V;E]) ,
where for every n, the random variable V n takes values over the set Vn, Fn : Vn → S(H⊗nA ) and all the in-
formation theoretic quantities are calculated with respect to the sequence of state ~ΘV BE :=
{
ΘV
nBnEn
}∞
n=1
,
where for every n
ΘV
nBnEn :=
∑
vn∈Vn
p(vn)|vn〉〈vn|V n ⊗NAn→Bnn
(
ρA
n
vn
)
.
Proof. Let the rate R be achievable. Therefore, there exists a sequence of codes satisfying the conditions
mentioned in Definition 8. Furthermore, let V n be uniformly distributed over [2nR]. Notice that for this
choice of V n the conditions mentioned in Definition 8 imply that
I[V ;E] = 0. (15)
The claim now follows from the following set of inequalities
R
a≤ I[V;B]
b
= I[V;B]− I[V;E]
≤ max
{Vn,Fn}∞n=1
(
I[V;B]− I¯[V;E]) ,
where a follows from [8, Lemma 3] and b follows from (15). This completes the proof.
Thus, an immediate consequence of Corollary 1 and Corollary 2 is the following proposition.
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Proposition 1. The private capacity P ( ~N ) of the sequence of quantum wiretap channels ~N satisfies the
following
P ( ~N ) = sup
{V n,Fn}∞n=1
(
I[V;B]− I[V;E]) ,
where for every n, the random variable V n takes values over the set Vn, Fn : Vn → S(H⊗nA ) and all the infor-
mation theoretic quantities are calculated with respect to the sequence of states ~ΘV BE :=
{
ΘV
nBnEn
}∞
n=1
,
where for every n
ΘV
nBnEn :=
∑
vn∈Vn
p(vn)|vn〉〈vn|V n ⊗NAn→Bnn
(
ρA
n
vn
)
.
6 One-Shot Quantum Covering Lemma
Theorem 5. Let X be a random variable taking values in the set X . For each x ∈ X , let ρx be a quantum
state in the space H. Let ρ = EX[ρX] be the average of the the states ρx. Fix I ≥ 0, and for each x ∈ X
define (based on I) the projection Πx and real number εx ∈ (0, 1) as follows:
Πx = {2Iρ  ρx};
εx = 1− Tr [Πxρx] .
Let ε = EX[εX]. Suppose s = (X[1],X[2], . . . ,X[M ]) is a sequence of independent random samples drawn
according to the distribution of X, and let ρ˜ = Em∈[M ][ρX[m]]. Then,
Pr
s
{‖ρ˜− ρ‖ ≥ 22√ε} ≤ 30C exp(− 10−16ε9
(log2 (dim(H)))6
M
2I
)
,
where C = dim(H)
(
log2
(
4 dim(H)
ε
)
+ 1
)2
.
Outline: To prove this concentration result, we will crucially employ the Operator Chernoff Bound of
Ahlswede and Winter [7]. We will, however, need to partition the underlying space so that the operators
involved are suitable for an application of the Operator Chernoff Bound. The operator Chernoff bound re-
quires a lower bound on the the smallest Eigen value of the expectation operator. Hence, we have to partition
the space into subspaces such that the ratio of the maximum Eigen value to the minimum Eigen value of
expectation operator is not too large. We still have to take care of the very small Eigen values of expecta-
tion operator but it turns out that we can simply neglect them introducing only small errors in the process.
This strategy of partitioning the space breaks up the operators into blocks. The operator Chernoff bound can
directly be applied to the diagonal blocks. However, the off diagonal blocks pose a problem because they
are non-Hermitian matrices and non-square matrices and the operator Chernoff bound does not directly apply
to them. We handle the off-diagonal blocks separately by proving a new Chernoff bound in terms of the
Schatten-infinity norm. We believe the new Chernoff lemma will be of independent interest.
First, we present the tools we will need.
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Tools
Theorem 6 (Operator Chernoff Bound of Ahlswede and Winter [7]). Let s = 〈ξ1, . . . , ξM 〉 beM independent
and identically distributed random varaibles taking values as bounded linear operators in some Hilbert space
H, such that ∀m ∈ [M ] : 0  ξm  I. Let the expectation µ = E[ξ1] satisfy µ  aI. Let ξ˜ = Em∈[M ][ξm] be
the sample average for the above sample. Then, for 0 < η < 12 , such that (1 + η)a ≤ 1, we have
Pr
{
(1− η)µ  ξ˜  (1 + η)µ
}
≥ 1− 2 dim(H) exp
(
−Mη
2a
2 ln(2)
)
. (16)
The bound µ  aI required in the above theorem will not be naturally available to us when we apply the
above theorem. It will therefore be convenient to state this bound in the following form.
Lemma 3. Let X be a random variable taking values in the set X . For each x ∈ X , let σx be a quantum
state in the space H such that 0  σx  λI . Let σ = EX[σX] be the average of the the states σx. Suppose
s = (X[1],X[2], . . . ,X[M ]) is a sequence of random samples drawn according to the distribution of X, and
let σ˜ = Em∈[M ][σX[m]]. Let ε, δ > 0 be such that ε < min{12 , λδ }, then
Pr {‖σ˜ − σ‖ ≤ ε (‖σ‖+ δ dim(H))} ≥ 1− 2 dim(H) exp
(−ε2M
2 ln(2)
δ
λ+ δ
)
. (17)
Proof. For every x ∈ X we will modify σx slightly to obtain ζx, and apply Theorem 6 to {pX(x), ζx}. Let
ζx := (σx + δI)/(λ+ δ) and ζ := EX [ζX] = (σ + δI)/(λ+ δ). Then,
• 0  ζx  I; and
• ζ  δI/(λ+ δ).
We will appy Theorem 6 with ξx ← ζx, η ← ε and a ← δ/(λ + δ). Note that the condition (1 + η)a ≤ 1
holds, since
(1 + ε)
(
δ
λ+ δ
)
≤
(
1 +
λ
δ
)(
δ
λ+ δ
)
= 1.
Thus, letting ζ˜ = Em∈[M ][ζX[m]], we conclude
Pr {‖σ˜ − σ‖ ≤ ε(‖σ‖+ δ dim(H))} = Pr
{∥∥∥ζ˜ − ζ∥∥∥ ≤ ε‖ζ‖}
≥ 1− 2 dim(H) exp
(−ε2M
2 ln (2)
δ
λ+ δ
)
.
We will also need a version of the Chernoff bound that is applicable to rectangular matrices. Versions of
the Hoeffding bound and the Bernstein bound for rectangular matrices (with max-norm instead of trace-norm)
have been derived by Tropp [12]. These results, however, do not seem to be strong enough for our application.
The complete proof of the following version (requiring substantial work based on Lemma 3) is presented in
Section 7.
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Lemma 4. Let X be a random variable taking values in the set X . Let d1 ≥ d2, β ≥ 1, and for each x ∈ X ,
let Ax ∈ Cd1×d2 such that ‖Ax‖ ≤ 1 and ‖Ax‖∞ ≤ βd2 . Let A = EX[AX] be the average of the states Ax.
Suppose s = (X[1],X[2], . . . ,X[m]) is a sequence of random samples drawn according to the distribution
of X , and let A˜ = Em∈[M ][AX[m]]. Then, for 0 < ε < 1,
Pr
s
{
‖A˜−A‖ ≥ ε
}
≤ 25d1 exp
(
−10−11ε3M
β
)
.
We will need the Gentle Measurement Lemma of Winter [13, Lemma 9] (see also [6, Lemma 9.4.2]).
Lemma 5. Let (px, ρx) be an ensemble of quantum states and ρ =
∑
x pxρx. Let 0  Λ  I and ε ∈ [0, 1]
be such that Tr[Λρ] ≥ 1− ε. Then, ∑
x
px
∥∥∥ρx −√Λρx√Λ∥∥∥ ≤ 2√ε.
In particular, if Λ is a projection operator, then
∑
x
px ‖ρx − ΛρxΛ‖ ≤ 2
√
ε.
6.1 Proof of Theorem 5
As stated above, our proof will be obtained by decomposing the space. We first present this decomposition.
Decomposition of the space: We describe the decomposition by explicitly presenting the orthogonal pro-
jector Πi onto the i-th component. LetD = dimH, and let the spectral decomposition of ρ be
∑D
j=1 λj |j〉〈j|,
where 1 ≥ λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ · · · ≥ λD ≥ 0 and
∑D
j=1 λj = 1. Then, for i = 1, 2, . . ., let
Πi =
∑
j:2−(i−1)≥λj>2−i
|j〉〈j|.
Let K =
⌈
log2
(
4 dim(H)
ε
)⌉
, let Π? =
∑K
i=1 Πi and Π
c
? =
∑
i>K Πi; then
Tr [Πc?ρ] ≤
ε
4
. (18)
Thus, intuitively, most of the mass of ρ resides in the subspace Π?. Hence, from triangle inequality and from
Lemma 5 it now follows that to prove Theorem 5 it is sufficient to show that ‖ρ˜−Π?ρΠ?‖ is small enough.
Proof. We will be use the following abbreviations.
ρ′x := ΠxρxΠx
ρ′ := EX[ρ′X]
ρ˜ := Em∈[M ][ρX[m]]
ρ˜′ := Em∈[M ][ρ′X[m]].
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Using the triangle inequality we have the following.
‖ρ˜− ρ‖ ≤ ‖ρ˜−Π?ρ˜Π?‖+
∥∥Π?ρ˜Π? −Π?ρ˜′Π?∥∥+ ∥∥Π?ρ˜′Π? −Π?ρ′Π?∥∥
+
∥∥Π?ρ′Π? −Π?ρΠ?∥∥+ ‖Π?ρΠ? − ρ‖
≤ ‖ρ˜−Π?ρ˜Π?‖+
∥∥ρ˜− ρ˜′∥∥+ ∥∥Π?ρ˜′Π? −Π?ρ′Π?∥∥+ ∥∥ρ′ − ρ∥∥
+ ‖Π?ρΠ? − ρ‖ . (19)
The following claims bound the terms on the right.
Claim 1. We first bound the first and last term.
‖Π?ρΠ? − ρ‖ ≤
√
ε; (20)
Pr
s
{‖ρ˜−Π?ρ˜Π?‖ ≥ √ε+ 2ε} ≤ exp (−2Mε2) . (21)
Claim 2. Next, we bound second and the second last term.∥∥ρ′ − ρ∥∥ ≤ 2√ε; (22)
Pr
s
{∥∥ρ˜− ρ˜′∥∥ ≥ 2√ε+ 2ε} ≤ exp (−2Mε2) . (23)
Claim 3. Finally, we bound the middle term.
Pr
{∥∥Π?ρ˜′Π? −Π?ρ′Π?∥∥ ≥ 8√ε+ 4ε} ≤ 28C exp(− 10−16ε9
(log2 (dim(H)))6
M
2I
)
, (24)
where C = dim(H)
(
log2
(
4 dim(H)
ε
)
+ 1
)2
.
For now, assume the above mentioned claims (which will proved below), and observe that from (19),
(20)–(24) it follows that with probability at least 1− 30C exp
(
− 10−16ε9
(log2(dim(H)))6
M
2I
)
, we have,
‖ρ˜− ρ‖ ≤ 22√ε. (25)
We now return to the claims.
Proof of Claim 1: Inequality (20) follows immediately from (18) and Lemma 5. To prove (21) observe that
by Lemma 5 we have
EX [‖ρX −Π?ρXΠ?‖] ≤
√
ε.
Further, for every x,
0 ≤ ‖ρx −Π?ρxΠ?‖ ≤ 2.
Thus, using triangle inequality and the Chernoff bound applied to the scalar quantitites ‖ρx −Π?ρxΠ?‖, we
have
Pr
s
{‖ρ˜−Π?ρ˜Π?‖ ≥ √ε+ 2ε} ≤ Pr
s
{
Em∈[M ]
[∥∥ρX[m] −Π?ρX[m]Π?∥∥] ≥ √ε+ 2ε} ≤ exp (−2Mε2) .
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Proof of Claim 2: From our assumption, ε = EX [εX ] = 1−EX[Tr ΠXρX]; that is, EX[Tr ΠXρX] = 1−ε.
Using the triangle inequality, Lemma 5 and Jensen’s inequality, we derive (22) as follows:
‖ρ′ − ρ‖ ≤ EX
[‖ρ′X − ρX‖] ≤ EX [2√εX] ≤ 2√ε.
Now (23) follows by applying the Chernoff bound to the scalar quantities ‖ρ′x − ρx‖.
Proof of Claim 3: This claim will need substantial work. Both expressions Π?ρ˜′Π? and Π?ρ′Π? involve the
operators ρ′x = ΠxρxΠx. The first expression is the expectation of ρ?,x := Π?ρ′xΠ? over the samples, whereas
the the second expression is the expectation of ρ?,x under the original distribution. That these quantities with
high probability should be close to each other would intuitively follow from the Operator Chernoff Bound.
However, we need to prepare the operators for an application of the bound. In fact, for every x ∈ X we will
obtain a decomposition
ρ?,x = ρ
−
?,x + ρ
+
?,x, (26)
(ρ−?,x and ρ+?,x are orthogonal) such that
EX
[
Tr[ρ+?,X]
]
≤ 4ε, (27)
implying (by Lemma 5)
EX
[∥∥∥ρ?,X − ρ−?,X∥∥∥] ≤ 4√ε, (28)
from which by a routine application Chernoff bound to the scalar quantitites
∥∥∥ρ?,X − ρ−?,X∥∥∥, it follows that
Pr
{∥∥∥Π?ρ˜Π? − Em∈[M ] [ρ−?,X[m]]∥∥∥ ≥ 4√ε+ 2ε} ≤ exp (−2ε2M) . (29)
Using triangle inequality we have∥∥Π?ρ˜′Π? −Π?ρ′Π?∥∥ ≤ ∥∥∥Π?ρ′Π? − EX [ρ−?,X]∥∥∥+ ∥∥∥Π?ρ˜′Π? − Em∈[M ] [ρ−?,X[m]]∥∥∥
+
∥∥∥Em∈[M ] [ρ−?,X[m]]− EX [ρ−?,X]∥∥∥ . (30)
From (28) and (29) it now follows that with probability at least 1− exp (−2ε2M) we have∥∥Π?ρ˜′Π? −Π?ρ′Π?∥∥ ≤ 8√ε+ 2ε+ ∥∥∥Em∈[M ] [ρ−?,X[m]]− EX [ρ−?,X]∥∥∥ . (31)
In the following sections, we will establish the following.
Pr
{∥∥∥Em∈[M ] [ρ−?,X[m]]− EX [ρ−?,X]∥∥∥ ≥ 2ε} ≤ 27C exp(− 10−16ε9(log2 (dim(H)))6 M2I
)
, (32)
where C = dim(H)
(
log2
(
4 dim(H)
ε
)
+ 1
)2
. Claim 3 thus follow from (28), (29), (30), (31) and (32). To
complete the proof, we need to provide the decomposition stated in (26) and establish (27) and (32). The
subsequent sections will be devoted to these.
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6.2 Decomposition of ρ?,x as ρ+?,x + ρ−?,x
Recall that
ρ?,x = Π?ΠxρxΠxΠ?,
where Π? =
∑K
i=1 Πi. For i ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,K} and x ∈ X , let
Π+i,x := {ΠiΠxρΠxΠi  4ΠiρΠi}
and Π−i,x := Πi − Π+i,x. Letting Π−?,x :=
∑K
i=1 Π
−
i,x and Π
+
?,x := Π? − Π−?,x we now have the following
decomposition of ρ?,x
ρ?,x = Π
−
?,xρ?,xΠ
−
?,x + Π
+
?,xρ?,xΠ
+
?,x, (33)
and, we have, in particular, letting λmax(ΠiρΠi) the maximum Eigen value of the operator ΠρΠi, we have
the following set of inequalities
Π−i,xΠxρxΠxΠ
−
i,x
a 2IΠ−i,xΠxρΠxΠ−i,x
b 2I+2λmax(ΠiρΠi)Πi, (34)
where a follows from the fact that ΠxρxΠx  2IΠxρΠx and b follows from the definition of Π−i,x and the fact
that Π−i,x  Πi
6.2.1 Proof of (27)
We will need the following key lemma.
Lemma 6. (a) If 〈v|ΠxρΠx|v〉 > 4〈v|ρ|v〉 then 〈v|ΠxρΠx|v〉 < 4〈v|ΠcxρΠcx|v〉.
(b) Let Π be some projection and Π+x be its subspace defined by Π+x := {ΠΠxρΠxΠ  4ΠρΠ}. Then,
Tr [Π+x ΠxρΠxΠ
+
x ] ≤ 4Tr [Π+x ΠcxρΠcxΠ+x ].
Proof. (a) We have
〈v|ΠxρΠx|v〉 > 4〈v|ρ|v〉
= 4 (〈v|ΠxρΠx|v〉+ 〈v|ΠxρΠcx|v〉+ 〈v|ΠcxρΠx|v〉+ 〈v|ΠcxρΠcx|v〉) (35)
By rearranging the terms of (35) we get
0 > 3〈v|ΠxρΠx|v〉+ 4〈v|ΠcxρΠcx|v〉+ 4 (〈v|ΠxρΠcx|v〉+ 〈v|ΠcxρΠx|v〉)
≥ 3〈v|ΠxρΠx|v〉+ 4〈v|ΠcxρΠcx|v〉 − 4 |〈v|ΠxρΠcx|v〉+ 〈v|ΠcxρΠx|v〉|
≥ 3〈v|ΠxρΠx|v〉+ 4〈v|ΠcxρΠcx|v〉 − 4 |〈v|ΠxρΠcx|v〉| − 4 |〈v|ΠcxρΠx|v〉|
≥ 3〈v|ΠxρΠx|v〉+ 4〈v|ΠcxρΠcx|v〉 − 4
∣∣〈v|Πxρ 12 ρ 12Πcx|v〉∣∣− 4∣∣〈v|Πcxρ 12 ρ 12Πx|v〉∣∣
a≥ 3〈v|ΠxρΠx|v〉+ 4〈v|ΠcxρΠcx|v〉 − 8
√
〈v|ΠxρΠx|v〉〈v|ΠcxρΠcx|v〉
=
(
3
√
α− 2
√
β
)(√
α− 2
√
β
)
= 3
(√
α− 2
3
√
β
)(√
α− 2
√
β
)
,
where a follows from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, α = 〈v|ΠxρΠx|v〉 and β = 〈v|ΠcxρΠcx|v〉. Thus,
2
3
√
β <
√
α < 2
√
β. In particular, 〈v|ΠxρΠx|v〉 = α < 4β = 4〈v|ΠcxρΠcx|v〉.
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(b) We will use part (a). Let Π+x =
∑d
i=1 |vi〉〈vi|, where {|vi〉} is an orthonormal basis for Π+x . Then,
Tr
[
Π+x ΠxρΠxΠ
+
x
]
=
d∑
i=1
〈vi|ΠxρΠx|vi〉
≤ 4
d∑
i=1
〈vi|ΠcxρΠcx|vi〉
= Tr
[
Π+x Π
c
xρΠ
c
xΠ
+
x
]
(36)
where the inequality above follows from part (a) and the definition of Π+x .
We now have all the ingredients to prove (27).
Tr
[
Π+?,xρ?,xΠ
+
?,x
] a
=
K∑
i=1
Tr
[
Π+i,xρ?,xΠ
+
i,x
]
b
=
K∑
i=1
Tr
[
Π+i,xΠxρxΠxΠ
+
i,x
]
c≤ 2I
K∑
i=1
Tr
[
Π+i,xΠxρΠxΠ
+
i,x
]
d≤ 2I
K∑
i=1
4Tr
[
Π+i,xΠ
c
xρΠ
c
xΠ
+
i,x
]
e≤ 4
K∑
i=1
Tr
[
Π+i,xΠ
c
xρxΠ
c
xΠ
+
i,x
]
f
≤ 4Tr [ΠcxρxΠcx] , (37)
where a follows from the definition Π+?,x and from the circular property of the trace and the fact that Π
+
i,xΠ
+
j,x =
0, for i 6= j; b follows from the fact that Π+i,x  Π?; c follows from the definition of Πx; d follows from the def-
inition of Π+i,x and Lemma 6; e follows from the definition of Π
c
x and f follows because
∑K
i=1 Π
+
i,x  I.Thus,
(27) now follows by computing the expectation of both sides of (37), using our assumption TrΠcxρx ≤ εx and
Ex[εx] = ε.
6.2.2 Proof of (32)
We will use the Operator Chernoff bound as stated in Lemma 3.
Claim 4. For i = 1, 2, . . . ,K, we have
Pr
{∥∥∥Em∈[M ][Π−i,X[m]ρ′X[m]Π−i,X[m]]− EX[Π−i,Xρ′XΠ−i,X]∥∥∥ ≤ ε2 (‖µi‖+ ‖ΠiρΠi‖)}
≥ 1− 2 dim(Πi) exp
( −ε2
8 ln 2
M
2I+3 + 1
)
, (38)
where µi = EX[Π−i,Xρ
′
XΠ
−
i,X].
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We appy Lemma 3 withH ← Πi; σx ← Π−i,xρ′xΠ−i,x; ε← ε2 and δ ← λmin(ΠiρΠi). Then, δ · dim(H) =
λmin(ΠiρΠi) · dim(H) ≤ ‖ΠiρΠi‖. With this the LHS of (17) matches the LHS of (38).
Next consider the RHS. Recall from (34) that Π−i,xΠxρxΠxΠ
−
i,x  2I+2λmax(ΠiρΠi)Πi. Thus, 0  σx 
2I+2λmax(ΠiρΠi)Πi. Now, 2I+2λmax(ΠiρΠi) ≤ 2I+3λmin(ΠiρΠi) = 2I+3δ. So, under our substitution the
RHS of (17) is at least the RHS of (38). Thus (38) is justified.
We are now ready to establish (32). We will account for the contributions from the diagonal and off-
diagonal blocks separately. We have from the definition of Π−?,x and triangle inequality that
∥∥∥Em∈[M ] [ρ−?,X[m]]− EX [ρ−?,X]∥∥∥ ≤ K∑
i=1
∥∥∥Em∈[M ][Π−i,X[m]ρ′X[m]Π−i,X[m]]− EX[Π−i,Xρ′XΠ−i,X]∥∥∥
+
∑
i 6=l
∥∥∥Em∈[M ][Π−i,X[m]ρ′X[m]Π−l,X[m]]− EX[Π−i,Xρ′XΠ−l,X]∥∥∥ (39)
The diagonal blocks: From Claim 4 and union bound it follows that with probability at least 1− 2 dim(H)
exp
(
−ε2
8 ln 2
M
2I+3+1
)
we have
K∑
i=1
∥∥∥Em∈[M ][Π−i,X[m]ρ′X[m]Π−i,X[m]]− EX[Π−i,Xρ′XΠ−i,X]∥∥∥ ≤ ε2
K∑
i=1
‖µi‖+ ε
2
K∑
i=1
‖ΠiρΠi‖
≤ ε. (40)
Off-diagonal blocks: For every i, l ∈ [1 : K] (i 6= l) it follows by ε← ε
K2
in Theorem 7 that
Pr
{∥∥∥Em∈[M ][Π−i,X[m]ρ′X[m]Π−l,X[m]]− EX[Π−i,Xρ′XΠ−l,X]∥∥∥ ≥ εK2}
≥ 1− 25 dim(H) exp
(
−10−12 ε
3
K6
M
2I
)
(41)
From (41) and letting K =
⌈
log2
(
4 dim(H)
ε
)⌉
it now follows using union bound that with probability at least
1− 25 dim(H)
(
log2
(
4 dim(H)
ε
)
+ 1
)2
exp
(
− 10−16ε9
(log2(dim(H)))6
M
2I
)
, we have
∑
i 6=l
∥∥∥Em∈[M ][Π−i,X[m]ρ′X[m]Π−l,X[m]]− EX[Π−i,Xρ′XΠ−l,X]∥∥∥ ≤ ε. (42)
Thus, from (39), (40) and (42) and union bound it follows that∥∥∥Em∈[M ] [ρ−?,X[m]]− EX [ρ−?,X]∥∥∥ ≤ 2ε,
with probability at least 27 dim(H)
(
log2
(
4 dim(H)
ε
)
+ 1
)2
exp
(
− 10−16ε9
(log2(dim(H)))6
M
2I
)
.
Theorem 7. Let X be a random variable taking values in a set X . For each x ∈ X , let ρx be a quan-
tum state in the space H. Let ρ = EX [ρX ] be the average of the the states ρx. Furthermore, let Πi =∑
j:2−(i−1)≥λj>2−i |j〉〈j| and Πl =
∑
j:2−(l−1)≥λj>2−l |j〉〈j|, where for every j, |j〉 and λj represent the
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Eigen vector and the corresponding Eigen value of ρ and i 6= l. Fix I > 0, and for each x ∈ X define (based
on I) the projections Πx, Π−i,x,Π
−
l,x, operators ρ
′
x, σ
−
i,l,x as follows:
Πx = {2Iρ  ρx}; (43)
ρ′x = ΠxρxΠx; (44)
Π−i,x = {ΠiΠxρΠxΠi  4ΠiρΠi} (45)
Π−l,x = {ΠlΠxρΠxΠl  4ΠlρΠl} (46)
σ−i,l,x = Π
−
i,xρ
′
xΠ
−
l,x (47)
Let s = (X[1],X[2], . . . ,X[M ]) be a sequence of M random samples drawn according to the distribution of
X, and let σ˜−i,l = Em∈[M ][σ
−
i,l,X[m]] and σ
−
i,l = EX
[
σ−i,l,X
]
. Then, for 0 < ε < 1,
Pr
s
{
‖σ˜−i,l − σ−i,l‖ ≥ ε
}
≤ 25 dim(H) exp
(
−10−12ε3M
2I
)
.
Proof. Let λmin(i) and λmax(i) be the minimum and maximum Eigen values of the operator ΠiρΠi and
analogously λmin(l) and λmax(l) represent the minimum and maximum Eigen values of the operator ΠlρΠl.
For each x ∈ X , notice the following set of inequalities∥∥∥σ−i,l,x∥∥∥∞ = ∥∥∥Π−i,xΠxρxΠxΠ−l,x∥∥∥∞
a
= max
u,w:‖u‖,‖w‖=1
∣∣∣〈u|Π−i,xΠxρxΠxΠ−l,x|w〉∣∣∣
b≤
√∣∣∣〈u|Π−i,xΠxρxΠxΠ−i,x|u〉∣∣∣√∣∣∣〈w|Π−l,xΠxρxΠxΠ−l,x|w〉∣∣∣
c≤
√∥∥∥Π−i,xΠxρxΠxΠ−i,x∥∥∥∞
√∥∥∥Π−l,xΠxρxΠxΠ−l,x∥∥∥∞
d≤ 2I+3
√
λmin(i)λmin(l), (48)
where a follows from the definition of the the infinity norm, b follows from Cauchy Schwarz inequality, c
again follows from the definition of infinity norm and d follows because of the following set of inequalities
Π−i,xΠxρxΠxΠ
−
i,x
a 2IΠ−i,xΠxρΠxΠ−i,x
b 2I+2Π−i,xρΠ−i,x
c
= 2I+2Π−i,xΠiρΠiΠ
−
i,x, (49)
where a follows from the definition of Πx (43), b follows from the definition of Π−i,x (45), c follows because
the projector Π−i,x projects onto a subspace of Πi. Thus, from (49) it now follows that∥∥∥Π−i,xΠxρxΠxΠ−i,x∥∥∥∞ ≤ 2I+2 ∥∥∥Π−i,xΠiρΠiΠ−i,x∥∥∥∞
a≤ 2I+2 ‖ΠiρΠi‖∞
≤ 2(I+2)λmax(i)
b≤ 2I+3λmin(i), (50)
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where a follows from [14, Proposition IV.2.4] and b follows from the fact that λmax(i)λmin(i) ≤ 2. Similarly,∥∥∥Π−l,xΠxρxΠxΠ−l,x∥∥∥∞ ≤ 2I+3λmin(l). Also, from the fact that ‖ΠxρxΠx‖ ≤ 1 it follows that∥∥∥σ−i,l,x∥∥∥ ≤ 1. (51)
For each x ∈ X , let us view the operator σ−i,j,x as non-square matrix in Cdim(Πi)×dim(Πl) embedded inside
Cdim(H)×dim(H) matrix. It now follows from (48) and (51) that both the conditions required for the application
of Lemma 8 are satisfied. The claim now immediately follows by β ← 2I+3 in the Lemma 8. This completes
the proof.
7 Chernoff Bound for non-square matrices
In this section, we prove a concentration result for non-square matrices which need not be positive. We first
restrict attention to square (but not necessarily positive) matrices.
Lemma 7. Let X be a random variable taking values in a set X . For each x ∈ X , let Ax ∈ Cd×d be a (not
necessarily positive) matrix. Let µ ≥ 0 and , β ≥ 1 be such that ‖Ax‖ ≤ µ and ‖Ax‖∞ ≤ βd for all x ∈ X .
Let A = EX [AX] be the average of the matrices Ax. Suppose s = (X[1],X[2], . . . ,X[M ]) is a sequence of
random samples drawn according to the distribution of X , and A˜ = Em∈[M ][AX[m]]. Then, for 0 < ε < 12 ,
Pr
s
{
‖A˜−A‖ ≤ ε
}
≥ 1− 4d exp
( −ε2
32 ln(2)µ
M
2β + µ
)
. (52)
Proof. We will establish our claim by embedding each Ax in a matrix let Bx ∈ C2d×2d as follows. Let
Ax =
∑d
k=1 λk|vk〉〈wk| where {vk}dk=1 and {wk}dk=1 are orthonormal bases and λk ≥ 0. We enlarge the
Hilbert space to obtainH′ = C2⊗Cd of dimension 2d, where we view C2 as a space of single qubit. Then, for
each vk let |v˜k〉 = |0〉|vk〉 and similarly for each wk let |w˜k〉 = |1〉|wk〉; then, the set {|v˜k〉 : k = 1, · · · , d} ∪
{|w˜k〉 : k = 1, · · · , d} is an orthonormal basis forH′. Let
Bx =
d∑
k=1
λk (|v˜k + w˜k〉〈v˜k + w˜k|) . (53)
Clearly Bx is a positive operator with the following spectral decomposition.
Bx =
d∑
k=1
2λk
( |v˜k + w˜k〉√
2
)(〈v˜k + w˜k|√
2
)
+
d∑
k=1
0
( |v˜k − w˜k〉√
2
)(〈v˜k − w˜k|√
2
)
. (54)
In particular, we have ‖Bx‖ ≤ 2 ‖Ax‖ and ‖Bx‖∞ ≤ 2 ‖Ax‖∞. We will apply Lemma 3 to obtain
a concentration with for the matrices Bx, and argue that a similar concentration must hold for Ax. Let
B˜ = Em∈[M ][BX[m]] and B = EX [BX]. We have 0  Bx  2βd I, ‖Bx‖ ≤ 2µ and ‖B‖ ≤ 2µ. We apply
Lemma 3 with σx ← Bx, λ← 2βd , ε← ε4µ and δ ← µd (note that λδ = 2βµ > ε4µ ) and conclude that
Pr
{∥∥∥B˜ −B∥∥∥ ≤ ε
4µ
(2µ+ δ2d)
}
≥ 1− 4d exp
(
−ε2M
32 ln(2)µ2
µ
d
2β
d +
µ
d
)
= 1− 4d exp
( −ε2
32 ln(2)µ
M
2β + µ
)
.
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Notice that the operator Bx has the following form.
Bx =

∑d
k=1 λk|v˜k〉〈v˜k| Ax
A†x
∑d
k=1 λk|w˜k〉〈w˜k|

. (55)
Thus,
Pr
{∥∥∥A˜−A∥∥∥ ≤ ε} ≥ Pr{∥∥∥B˜ −B∥∥∥ ≤ ε} ≥ 1− 4d exp( −ε2
32 ln(2)µ
M
2β + µ
)
.
Corollary 3. Let X be a random variable taking values in the set X . For each x ∈ X , let Ax ∈ Cd1×d2
(d2 ≤ d1 ≤ 2d2) be a non-positive matrix together with the property that ‖Ax‖ ≤ µ and ‖Ax‖∞ ≤ βd1 .
Let A = EX [AX] be the average of the matrices Ax Suppose s = (X[1],X[2], . . . ,X[M ]) be a sequence of
random samples drawn according to the distribution of X , and let A˜ = Em∈[M ][AX[m]]. Then, for 0 < ε < 12
Pr
s
{
‖A˜−A‖ ≤ ε)
}
≤ 1− 4d1 exp
( −ε2
32 ln(2)µ
M
2β + µ
)
. (56)
Proof. This claim differs from Lemma 7 because we do not requireAx to be a square matrix. We can obtain a
matrixBx fromAx by adding d1−d2 all zeroes columns. Let the corresponding expectations beB = EX [BX]
and B˜ = Em∈[M ][BX[m]]. Note that ‖Bx‖ = ‖Ax‖ ≤ µ, ‖Bx‖∞ = ‖Ax‖∞ ≤ βd1 and ‖B˜ −B‖ = ‖A˜−A‖.
The claim then follows immediately by taking Ax ← Bx in the Lemma 7.
7.1 Concentration result for non-square matrices
We can now show the main concentration result of this section.
Lemma 8. Let X be a random variable taking values in the set X . For each x ∈ X , let Ax ∈ Cd1×d2 such
that d1 ≥ d2, ‖Ax‖ ≤ 1 and ‖Ax‖∞ ≤ βd2 , where β ≥ 1. Let A = EX[AX] be the average of the states Ax.
Suppose s = (X[1],X[2], . . . ,X[m]) be a sequence of random samples drawn according to the distribution
of X , and let A˜ = Em∈[M ][AX[m]]. Then for 0 < ε < 1,
Pr
s
{
‖A˜−A‖ ≥ ε
}
≤ 25d1 exp
(
−10−11ε3M
β
)
. (57)
Proof. We will rely on Corollary 3, which provides us a similar concentration result when d1 ∼ d2 (the
crucial difference is that the guarantee on ‖Ax‖∞ is now in terms of d2, which may be much smaller than
d1). We will embed the matrix Ax in a d1× d1 matrix Bx. The matrix Bx will be constructed from Ax in two
steps. Let d1 = qd2 + r, where 0 ≤ r ≤ d2 and q ≥ 0 are integers.
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Step 1→ We stack q copies of Ax side by side to obtain
A˜x =
1
q
 Ax Ax · · · Ax
 . (58)
Note that A˜x has d1 rows and d˜2 = qd2 columns; in particular, d1 ≤ 2d˜2 as required in Corollary 3.
However, in the present form, the values of A˜x the ‖A˜x‖ and ‖A˜x‖∞ are not good enough to obtain the
desired concentration from Corollary 3: in particular, the contributions from the q copies of Ax add up
and ‖A˜x‖∞ grows too large (despite the normailization by q). In order to keep the contributions from
adding up, we will apply random shifts.
Step 2→ For i ∈ [q], let Gi be the following d1 × d1 matrix of the form (γij)di,j=1, where γij is a complex
gaussian, that is, it has the form (aij+
√−1bij)/
√
2d, where aij , bij are chosen independently according
to the standard normal distribution N(0, 1); further the random choices made for the different Gi are
independent. With this choice of g = 〈G1, G2, . . . , Gq〉, let
Agx =
1
q
 G1Ax G2Ax · · · GqAx
 . (59)
This completes our embedding of Ax into a larger d1 × d˜2 matrix Agx. Note that this random embedding is
determined by the random choice of g (the same g is used for all Ax); when the same operation is performed
starting with a d1 × d2 matrix B, we will refer to the resulting matrix as Bg.
The plan: As stated before, the idea is to show that the concentration result of Lemma 7 is applicable to the
matrices Agx, and conclude from this that the claimed concentrtion holds for the original matices Ax. Let
A˜g = Em∈[M ][A
g
X[m]];
Ag = EX[A
g
X].
We thus have three tasks ahead of us (the first two help us bound µ and β when applying Lemma 7 to Agx, and
the third helps us conclude a concentration result for Ax from the concentration result for A
g
x).
(i) Derive an upper bound for ‖Agx‖;
(ii) Derive an upper bound for ‖Agx‖∞ ;
(iii) Relate the events E1 := ‖A˜−A‖ ≥ ε and E ′1 := ‖A˜g −Ag‖ ≥ ε′ for an appropriate ε′.
In the following set ` = 10 and t = 4 ln
(
480`3
ε
)
.
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(i) The upper bound for ‖Agx‖: Consider the event
Eg := {∀x ∈ X : ‖Agx‖ ≤ `‖Ax‖}
Claim 5.
Pr{‖Gi‖∞ ≤ `, for i = 1, 2, . . . , q} ≥ 1− exp
(−`2
16
)
;
Pr{Eg} ≥ 1− exp
(−`2
16
)
≥ 99
100
.
The second inequality follows immediately from the first: if ‖Gi‖∞ ≤ ` for all i ∈ [q], then
‖Agx‖ ≤
1
q
q∑
i=1
‖Gi‖∞‖Ax‖ ≤ `‖Ax‖.
To see the first inequality, observe that
Pr{‖Gi‖∞ > `, for some i = 1, 2, . . . , q}
a≤ qPr{‖G1‖∞ > `}
b≤ d1 exp
(
−d1 `
2
16
)
(60)
c≤ exp
(
− `
2
16
)
, (61)
where a follows from the union bound because since Gis are identically distributed, b follows from Fact 1
below (note we assumed ` = 10 ≥ 6), and c follows because the right hand side of (60) is maximum when
d1 = 1. (End of Claim)
(ii) The upper bound on ‖Agx‖∞: The random shifts applied to the matrices will be crucial in keeping
‖Agx‖∞ under control. Let A be a d1 × d2. To bound ‖Ag‖∞, consider the singular value decomposition of
A:
A = UΛV †. (62)
Consider the matrix
Aˆ =
1
q
 H1Λ H2Λ · · · HqΛ


V † 0 · · · · · · 0
0 V † · · · · · · 0
... 0
. . . · · · ...
...
... · · · . . . ...
0 0 · · · · · · V †
 , (63)
where Hj = GjU , for j = 1, 2, . . . , q. Notice that the matrices Aˆ and Ag are identical. The matrix on the
extreme right is unitary and the norm does not change by its action. So, we focus on
A′ =
1
q
 H1Λ H2Λ · · · H d1d2 Λ
 . (64)
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Next, for every j = 1, 2, . . . , q, let Tj be an unitary such that it exchanges the kth row of Λ with its ((j −
1)d2 + k)
th row, for k = 1, 2, . . . , d2. Let H ′j = HjT †j , for j = 1, 2, . . . , q, and notice that the matrix
1
q
 H ′1T1Λ H ′2T2Λ · · · H ′qTqΛ
 , (65)
is identical with A′. Let,
Λ¯ =

λ1 0 · · · 0 · · · · · · 0
0
. . . 0 · · · · · · · · · 0
... · · · λd2 · · · · · · · · ·
...
... · · · · · · . . . · · · · · · ...
... 0 · · · · · · λ1 · · ·
...
... · · · · · · · · · · · · . . . ...
0 · · · · · · 0 · · · · · · λd2

, (66)
where {λ1, · · · , λd2} are the singular values of the matirx A. It now follows that the matrix A′ is equivalent
in distribution with the matrix
A¯ =
1
q
H¯Λ¯, (67)
where the matrix H¯ ∈ Cd1×d1 is a random matrix with the same distribution as the Gi. We will now use this
reformulation to analyse ‖Agx‖∞.
Let
Ix :=
{
1 if ‖Agx‖∞ > tq‖Ax‖∞
0 otherwise
, (68)
We will show that Ix is rarely 1 and conclude that with high probability for most x (with respect to the
distribution of X), ‖Agx‖∞ is small; furthermore, we will argue that the x for which Ix = 1 do not contribute
to the sample average of A˜g. To state this formally, let
E2 :=
{∑
x
PX(x)Ix <
ε
480`
}
; (69)
E3 :=
{∥∥Em∈[M ][AgIX[m]]∥∥ < ε240} . (70)
Claim 6.
Pr{Ix = 1} ≤ exp
(
− t
2
16
)
; (71)
Pr{E2} ≥ 1−
(
480`
ε
)
exp
(
− t
2
16
)
≥ 99
100
; (72)
Pr{E3 | E2 ∩ Eg} ≥ 1− exp
(
−2
( ε
480`
)2
M
)
. (73)
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For the first inequality, we carry out the above analysis with A := Agx and arrive at (71) using Fact 1.
The second inequality follows from the first using Markov’s inequality.
The third inequality is just a statement about concentration of scalar sample averages near the true average,
and follows from the definition of E2 and E3 by a routine application of the scalar Chernoff bound. (End of
Claim)
Lower bound on ‖A˜g − Ag‖: We wish to show that the probability of the event E1 := ‖A˜ − A‖ ≥ ε can
be bounded in terms of the event E ′1 := ‖A˜g − Ag‖ ≥ ε′ for an appropriate ε′; the operators A˜g are better
suited for an application of our concentration ineqalities and we will be able to bound Pr[E ′1] directly. Ideally
we would like the following event to hold:
E4 :=
{
‖A˜g −Ag‖ ≥ 1
120
‖A˜−A‖
}
(74)
Because we construct Agx from Ax randomly (and not deterministically), this need not always hold.
Claim 7. For every operator B ∈ Cd1×d2 ,
Pr{‖Bg‖ ≥ 1
120
‖B‖} ≥ 0.22.
Further, taking ε′ = ε/120 in the definion of E ′, we have
Pr
{E ′1 | E1} ≥ Pr{E4 | E1} ≥ 0.22.
We show the first inequality in Lemma 9 below. The second follows from the first because
A˜g −Ag = (A˜−A)g.
Note that g is chosen independently of the random sample on which A˜g depends. (End of Claim)
We can now complete the proof of our lemma. Consider the event
E∗ = E1 ∩ E2 ∩ E4 ∩ Eg.
Note that E2 and Eg depend only the random choices Gi (and not the sample s), and are thus independent of
E1. Thus, E1 is independent of the rest. Thus, from the claims above, using the union bound, we conclude
that
Pr{E2 ∩ E4 ∩ Eg | E1} ≥ 0.22− 1
100
− 1
100
=
1
5
.
Thus,
Pr{E∗} ≥ 1
5
Pr{E1} (75)
Now, if E∗ holds then we have (from E1 ∩ E4) that
ε
120
≤
∥∥∥Em∈[M ][AgX[m]]− EX[AgX]∥∥∥
≤
∥∥∥Em∈[M ][AgX[m]IcX[m]]− EX[AgXIcX]∥∥∥+ ∥∥∥Em∈[M ][AgX[m]IX[m]]∥∥∥+ ∥∥EX[AgXIX]∥∥ .
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Thus, one of the three terms on the right must be large; in particular, if E∗ holds, then one of the following
three events must hold:
Ea =
{∥∥∥Em∈[M ][AgX[m]IcX[m]]− EX[AgXIcX]∥∥∥ ≥ ε480}
Eb =
{∥∥∥Em∈[M ][AgX[m]IX[m]]∥∥∥ ≥ ε240}
Ec =
{∥∥EX[AgXIX]∥∥ ≥ ε480} .
We will bound E∗ by bounding each of Pr{Ea ∩ E∗}, Pr{Eb ∩ E∗} and Pr{Ec ∩ E∗}. Since E∗ includes E2 and
Eg, we conclude that Ec ∩ E∗ is impossible. Also, from Claim 6 (see inequality (73))
Pr{Eb ∩ E∗} ≤ Pr{Eb | E2 ∩ Eg} ≤ exp
(
−2
( ε
480`
)2
M
)
.
We now bound Pr{Ea ∩ E∗}. Towards this notice that ‖AgxIcx‖∞ ≤ tβd1 , furthermore under the assumption of
the event E∗ (recall that event E∗ includes the event Eg) we have ‖AgxIcx‖ ≤ `. We now get the desired bond
by invoking Corollary 3 with d← d1, ε← ε480 , Ax ← AgxIcx, µ← ` and β ← tβ and conclude that
Pr{Ea ∩ E∗} ≤ Pr{Ea | E∗} ≤ 4d1 exp
(−(ε/480)2
32 ln(2)`
M
2tβ + `
)
≤ 4d1 exp
(−(ε/480)2
32 ln(2)4t`
M
β
)
.
Since ` = 10 and t = 4 ln
(
480`3
ε
)
, we conclude, that
1
5
Pr{E1} ≤ Pr{E∗} ≤ 4d1 exp
(
−10−11ε3M
β
)
+ exp
(−10−8ε2M) . (76)
Our claim follows from this.
Lemma 9. Let A ∈ Cd1×d2 . Then,
Pr
{
‖Ag‖ ≥ 1
120
‖A‖
}
≥ 0.22. (77)
Proof. We proceed as we did above to bound ‖Agx‖∞. Recall the formulation in (67). Thus, it suffices to
show
Pr
{∥∥H¯Λ¯∥∥ ≥ q
120
‖A‖
}
≥ 0.22, (78)
We will show the following.
Claim 8.
Pr
{∥∥H¯Λ¯∥∥ ≥ 1
6
Tr[H¯†H¯Λ¯]
}
≥ 0.98. (79)
Claim 9.
Pr
{
Tr[H¯†H¯Λ¯] ≥ 1
20
d1
d2
‖A‖
}
≥ 0.24. (80)
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Note that (78) follows from these claims because, with probability at least 0.22, we have∥∥H¯Λ¯∥∥ ≥ 1
6
Tr[H¯†H¯Λ¯] ≥ 1
120
d1
d2
‖A‖ .
It remains to prove Claim 8 and Claim 9.
Proof of Claim 8: Notice the following set of inequalities
Tr[H¯†H¯Λ¯] ≤ ‖H¯‖∞
∥∥H¯Λ¯∥∥
≤ 6 ∥∥H¯Λ¯∥∥ , (81)
where (81) follows under the assumption of the event ‖H¯‖∞ ≤ 6 which happens with probability at least
0.98 (see Fact 1 below).
Proof of Claim 9: Let {κ1, · · · , κd1} represent the diagonal entries of the matrix H¯†H¯ . Furthermore,
from the definition of H¯ it follows that each of the κis can be represented as χi2d1 , where for every i ∈ [1 : d1],
χi is chi-squared distributed with 2d1 degrees of freedom. It is easy to see that Tr[H¯†H¯Λ¯] =
∑d1
i=1
χiλi
2d1
. For
every i ∈ [1 : d1], let
Ii :=
{
1 if χi ≥ d1
0 otherwise.
(82)
Thus, it now follows from (82) that
Tr[H¯†H¯Λ¯] ≥ 1
2
d1∑
i=1
Iiλi. (83)
Notice that
E
[
d1∑
i=1
Iiλi
]
= Pr {χi ≥ d1} ‖Λ¯‖. (84)
By Fact 1 (b) below (with β = 12 and d1 ≥ 2), we obtain
Pr {χi ≥ d1} > 0.32, (85)
implying that
E
[
d1∑
i=1
Iiλi
]
≥ 0.32‖Λ¯‖.
Thus, since
∑d1
i=1 Iiλi ≤ ‖Λ¯‖, we have from Fact 1 (c) that
Pr
{
d1∑
i=1
Iiλi > 0.1‖Λ¯‖
}
> 0.24. (86)
The claim now follows from (83) and (86). This completes the proof.
Fact 1. (a) For i, j = 1, 2, . . . , d, let the random complex number γij = (aij +
√−1bij)/
√
2d be such
that aij , bij are chosen independently according to the normal standard distribution N(0, 1). Let G ∈
Cd1×d1 be the random matrix (γij)di,j=1. Then, for ` ≥ 6,
Pr{‖G‖∞ ≥ `} ≤ exp
(
−d`
2
16
)
. (87)
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(b) Let X = η21 + η
2
2 + · · ·+ η22d where each ηi is chosen independently with distribution N(0, 1) (that is,
X has chi-squared distribution with 2d degrees of freedom). Then, for 0 < β < 1
Pr{X < 2βd} ≤ (βe1−β)d.
(c) Let X be a positive random variable that satisfies Pr{X ≤ α} = 1 for some constant α. Then for
c ≤ E[X],
Pr{X > c} ≥ E[X]− c
α− c .
Proof.
(a) See [15, Fact 6]
(b) The moment generating function of X is given by E[etX ] = (1− 2t)−d for t < 12 [16]. Set t = −1−β2β < 0
and observe that etx > e2tβd, whenever x ≤ 2βd. By Markov’s inequality
Pr{X < 2βd} ≤ (1− 2t)−de−2tβd = (βe1−β)d.
(c) This claim follows from Markov’s inequality. To see this let Xˆ = α−X . It now follows that Pr {X ≤ c} =
Pr
{
Xˆ ≥ α− c
}
≤ E[Xˆ]α−c = α−E[X]α−c .
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